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A WASTE OF TIME
A Waste of Time: Harmonizing the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
Under the Lens of Federalism
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014)
Stephen M. Cady
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 9658 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) gives the federal government
the power to preempt state law statutes of limitation in certain tort and
property actions.1 In recent years, § 9658 has become the subject of heated
debate regarding whether it also extends federal preemption to state law
statutes of repose.2 This question was addressed in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,
where the United States Supreme Court held that § 9658 does not preempt
statutes of repose.3
However, this issue has largely escaped scrutiny from a federalist
perspective.4 Instead, courts have primarily focused on § 9658 as a matter of
statutory interpretation.5 This is somewhat surprising given that § 9658 has
the potential to dramatically alter the operation of state tort and property
law.6 This note analyzes the legal implications of the CTS Corp. decision and
how it affects important concerns of state sovereignty in the United States’
federalist system.

1

42 U.S.C § 9658(a)(1) (2012).
Jesse Kyle, Waldburger v. CTS Corporation: Ensuring the Plaintiff’s Day in Court As a
Matter of Principle, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 66, 68 (2014).
3
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014).
4
Robin Kundis Craig, Federalism Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 SW. L. REV.
617, 621 (2012).
5
Kyle, supra note 2, at 76.
6
Craig, supra note 4, at 642.
2
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 to combat the increasing danger
of toxic waste dumping throughout the United States.7 Even though
CERCLA is specifically aimed at promoting efficient and equitable responses
to the fallout from hazardous waste,8 courts have criticized its lack of
precision and clarity.9 CERCLA’s purpose is to “establish a program for
appropriate environmental response action to protect public health and the
environment from the dangers posed by [inactive hazardous waste] sites,”10
as well as to shift the financial burden of waste cleanup to the parties
responsible for the contamination.11 However, it has been disputed exactly
how much power CERCLA has over existing state laws addressing the same
problems.12 Specifically, the question is: to what extent does the federally
enacted CERCLA preempt state statutes of limitations and repose?13
Although statutes of limitations and repose are both legal instruments
that limit a cause of action by imposing a time constraint,14 there are several
key differences.15 While a statute of limitation imposes a time constraint on
the time before which a plaintiff may bring a cause of action in court, a
statute of repose limits the time during which a defendant may be found
liable for a plaintiff’s injuries.16 A limitations period begins to run once a
7

Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 734 F.3d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175
(2014).
8
Id.
9
Id; See State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d. 1032, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1985);
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle Cnty., 851 F.2d. 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988)
10
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016 (1980).
11
Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing
& Coatings, Inc., 473 F. 3d. 824 (7th Cir. 2007)
12
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014); compare, e.g., Burlington N. &
S.F.R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 2005) and Clark County v.
Sioux Equipment Corp., 753 N.W. 2d 406, 417 (S.D. 2008) with McDonald v. Sun Oil Co.,
548 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175
(2014).
13
Id.
14
Andrew A. Ferrer, Excuses, Excuses: The Application of Statutes of Repose to
Environmentally-Related Injuries, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 345, 348 (2006).
15
Id.
16
Id.
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plaintiff’s cause of action accrues.17 On the other hand, a repose period
begins after the defendant’s last act or omission.18 Even if a plaintiff files an
action within a limitations period, the claim may still be considered
extinguished if it is outside the repose period.19
The CERCLA provision in question, § 9658, originated as an
amendment. It was enacted after a congressional report was commissioned to
“determine the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in
providing legal redress for harm . . . caused by the release of hazardous
substances into the environment.”20 The resulting report proposed certain
changes to state tort law that would allow tort actions resulting from
hazardous waste dumping to start accruing after a plaintiff discovers or
should have reasonably discovered the harm—the “discovery rule”—in order
to address the type of latent harm unique to environmental injuries.21
Congress’ reasoning for this recommendation stemmed from the fact that
injuries caused by hazardous waste dumping often have long latency periods
of twenty years or more, time during which harm may not be ascertainable to
the victim.22 Because of this, Congress reasoned, normal state statutes of
limitations and repose often fully run before a plaintiff becomes aware of his
or her injury, barring them from recovery.23
After recommending that states change their statutes of limitations
and repose to reflect this recommendation, Congress instead decided to act at
the federal level and amend CERCLA to preempt theses state statutes in
favor of the “discovery” rule in situations where the state limitations period
begins to run earlier than the federal limitations period.24

17

Id.
Id.
19
Id. at 349.
20
42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1) (2012).
21
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 439 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175
(2014); Superfund Section 301(e) Study Grp., 97th Cong., Injuries and Damages from
Hazardous Wastes--Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, S. Doc. No. 97-571
(Comm. Print 1982).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2181 (2014).
18

76

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1
However, where the congressional report specifically recommended
that states change both their statutes of limitations and, the much stricter,
statutes of repose to include the “discovery rule,” § 9658 only mentions
statutes of limitations within the actual text.25 As a result, this inconsistency
has created confusion in that courts, where they are conflicted on how to
interpret § 9658 and whether it was meant to include both statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose.26 Prior to the CTS Corp. decision, the
highest federal courts to discuss this issue were the Fifth27 and Ninth28
Circuits.
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co.,
the Fifth Circuit ruled that § 9658 could not be interpreted to include statutes
of repose.29 In that case, a Texas railroad sued an owner of chemical storage
tanks whose tanks ruptured and spilled all over one of the railroad’s right-ofways, prompting an expensive cleanup.30 In response, the storage tank owner
filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer of the tank, alleging
that the tank had been sold to the owner in a defective condition.31 Because
the relevant state statute of repose had already run, barring the owner from
recovering from the manufacturer, the case turned on whether § 9658 of
CERCLA was created with the purpose of including statutes of repose.32 The
court reasoned that the plain language of the provision, and “the fundamental
principle of statutory interpretation—common sense” made it clear that §
9658 did not include statutes of repose.33

25

Id. at 2185.
Compare, e.g., Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355, 362 (5th
Cir. 2005) and Clark County v. Sioux Equipment Corp., 753 N.W. 2d 406, 417 (S.D. 2008)
with McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp.
v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
27
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F. 3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005).
28
McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. v.
Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
29
Burlington, 419 F.3d at 362.
30
Id. at 358.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 361-62.
33
Id. at 362, 364.
26
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In McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.34 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the term
“statute of limitations” was historically ambiguous and that the provision’s
legislative history was proof that § 9658 was meant to include statutes of
repose.35 In that case, property owners sued a mining company for
negligence, contribution, breach of contract, and fraud in relation to the sale
of property containing contaminated waste.36 In holding that § 9658 included
statutes of repose, the court looked to the history of the terms, which it
decided were used interchangeably at the time of the provision’s enactment,
creating confusion as to precisely what the term “statute of limitations”
meant.37 Additionally, the court cited Congressional Report 301(e) as
evincing Congress’ primary purpose in passing the amendment as a remedy
for situations in which a plaintiff may lose a cause of action before becoming
aware of the harm.38 Establishing this purpose, it is only proper that § 9658
would include statutes of repose as well.39
III. FACTS AND HOLDING
Respondents (“Landowners”) are twenty-five landowners occupying
land previously owned and used by Petitioner, CTS Corporation (“CTS”), to
operate an electronics plant.40 While under the ownership of CTS from 1959
to 1985, the chemicals trichloroethylene (“TCE”) and cis–1, 2–
dichloroethane were stored on the land as part of CTS’ manufacturing and
disposing of electronics.41 Both of these chemicals have carcinogenic
effects.42 After the property was sold in 1987, the landowners purchased it in
the instant action.43 Upon learning from the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) that the well water was contaminated with these chemicals
in 2009, the landowners brought suit in 2011—twenty-four years after CTS
34

McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F. 3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. v.
Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2181 (2014).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 777.
37
Id. at 781.
38
Id. at 783.
39
Id. at 779.
40
CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
41
Id.
42
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 439 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
43
CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181.
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sold the property—alleging damages sustained from the chemical storage on
the land.44
The original suit, filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina, was a state law nuisance action brought
against CTS seeking (1) reclamation of “toxic chemicals contaminants”
belonging to CTS; (2) “remediation of the environmental harm caused by
these contaminants;” and (3) monetary damages to compensate for the harm
and losses the landowners suffered because of the chemical storage.45 CTS
moved to dismiss the claim, citing North Carolina’s statute of repose for real
property actions, which prevents individuals from bringing a tort claim
against a defendant more than ten years after the “last act or omission of the
defendant giving rise to the cause of action.”46 The landowners countered that
dismissal was improper under § 9658 of CERCLA.47
The trial court granted CTS’s motion, holding that § 9658 did not
apply, as it only mentions statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose.48
Because the last culpable act of CTS, the defendant, occurred in 1987 when
the property was sold, the trial court held that the North Carolina statute of
repose barred the claim.49
The landowners appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which reversed and remanded the decision of the trial court in favor
of the landowners.50 The Fourth Circuit reached its decision by finding that
although the trial court’s reading of the provision was not necessarily wrong,
§ 9658 was ambiguous at best, and capable of multiple interpretations.51
Because of this, the court interpreted the meaning that most precisely
effectuated Congress’ intent when it created the provision.52 To determine

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (2014).
47
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
48
Id.
49
CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181.
50
Id.
51
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441.
52
Id. at 444.
45
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this congressional intent, the court looked “beyond the language of the
provision to the legislative history for guidance.”53
The Fourth Circuit was unconvinced that the mere omission of the
term “statute of repose” was dispositive of Congress’ desire to leave such
situations out of § 9658. In support, the court cited scholars’ and courts’
historical tendencies to use the phrases interchangeably.54 Additionally, the
court found that the trial court’s interpretation of the provision “thwarted
Congress’ unmistakable goal of removing barriers to relief from toxic
wreckage.”55 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and
remanded for litigation.56
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
decision of the Fourth Circuit, holding that the lower appellate court’s
interpretation of the provision was both unfounded and against the natural
interpretation of the text of § 9658.57 In its opinion, the Court held that
although it was true that there was historical ambiguity concerning the use of
the term “statute of limitation,” it was unnecessary to reach for these
interpretations because of the existence of a congressional report, which was
the basis for the addition of § 9658 in the first place.58
The Court considered the report, which distinguished and discussed
both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, as clear evidence that
Congress was aware of the distinction between the terms and chose to leave
statutes of repose out of § 9658.59 Additionally, the Court held that other key
features of the provision’s textual language, including singular usage of the
term “statute” throughout, as apparent applicability to only pre-existing civil
actions. Tolling is further proof that § 9658 does not cover state statutes of
repose.60

53

Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
55
Id. at 444.
56
Id. at 445.
57
CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2180.
58
Id. at 2186.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 2186-88.
54
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The Court remained unconvinced by the Fourth Circuit’s argument
that § 9658 should impliedly preempt statutes of repose because of the
obstacle they pose to the execution of CERCLA’s goals.61 Because of the
number of other important areas of state law that remain unattended to by
CERCLA, one more area—statutes of repose—is an unacceptable barrier to
CERCLA’s goals and purposes.62 Lastly, the Court held that where a
preemptory interpretation of a federal statute over state law can be avoided, it
should be for purposes of federalism.63
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after being
originally brought in the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina and appealing to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.64 The instant Court reviewed the case to determine whether a
grant of a motion to dismiss was proper, a decision that hinged on whether §
9658 of CERCLA was written to preempt state statutes of repose as well as
statutes of limitations.65
In analyzing this issue, the Court first established that state statutes of
limitations are clearly preempted by § 9658.66 Section 9658 names statutes of
limitations as specifically subject to this preemption.67 However, as the Court
noted, § 9658 does not say anything about state statutes of repose.68 While
the Fourth Circuit held that statutes of repose could impliedly be read into the
federal statute,69 the Court was unconvinced for several reasons.70
First, the Court denounced the Fourth Circuit’s decision to interpret
this statute broadly and liberally, instead of based solely on the provision’s
61

Id. at 2188.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 2178.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 2180; see 42 U.S.C § 9658(b)(4)(A) (2012).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2180.
70
Id. at 2179.
62
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text and structure.71 While the lower court thought that a liberal interpretation
was appropriate because of the remedial purpose of the federal statute, the
Court held that this logic was faulty, as almost any statute could be described
as remedial.72 No legislation, it stated, should be pursued at any cost.73
Next, the Court conceded that omitting the phrase “statute of repose”
was not dispositive of Congress’ intent to leave it out of § 9658, given the
informal way that the phrase “statute of limitation” was used in the past.74
However, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on historical
ambiguity of the distinction between statutes of limitation and statutes of
repose was misguided.75 Instead, the Fourth Circuit should have looked to
the 1982 congressional study group report, which spurned the creation of §
9658, for guidance on this issue.76 That report was instructive in interpreting
the federal statute because, while it does distinguish and discuss both statutes
of limitation and statutes of repose, the actual statute only discusses statutes
of limitation.77 Therefore, the Court found that there was a strong argument
that Congress chose specifically to omit statutes of repose from the federal
statute.78
Even though this fact alone was not dispositive of an unambiguous
reading of the provision, the Court went on to note that omitting the phrase
“statutes of repose,” together with other key textual features of § 9658, made
it clear that the federal statute was not meant to include statutes of repose.79
Specifically, the text of the provision includes language describing
the covered period in the singular, which seems to imply that only statutes of
limitation, and not both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are
meant to be included.80 Additionally, the Court noted that § 9658 speaks

71

Id. at 2185.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 2186.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2186-87.
72

82

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1
only of when “cause of action” may be brought.81 This is important because
statutes of repose are not related to the accrual of causes of action, but rather
serve to prohibit actions from commencing.82 Thus, the federal statute
presupposes that a cause of action already exists, making statutes of
limitation the only relevant time limits considered in § 9658.83
The last textual feature of the federal statute that the Court found
controlling was the discussion of equitable tolling for minor or incompetent
plaintiffs.84 Because a critical distinction between statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose is the inability of statutes of repose to be delayed by
estoppel or tolling, the Court found this feature to be an “altogether
unambiguous textual indication that § 9658 does not preempt statutes of
repose.”85
While the Fourth Circuit argued that an implied inclusion of statutes
of repose into the federal statute was necessary to advance CERCLA’s
purpose and goals, the instant Court disagreed.86 The Fourth Circuit held that
the purpose of CERCLA was to help plaintiffs bring tort actions for harm
caused by toxic contaminants and, because statutes of repose create an
unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment of that goal, the federal statute
must impliedly preempt them as well.87 However, CERCLA actually does
not provide a general cause of action for those harmed by toxic contaminants,
but rather leaves the states’ judgment about causes of action, scope of
liability, burdens of proof, rules of evidence, and other important rules
governing civil actions untouched.88 Since CERCLA leaves many areas of
state law “untouched,” the Court held that the Fourth Circuit failed to show
why statutes of repose were any different or an “especially egregious”
omission.89
81

Id. at 2187.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(B) (2012)).
85
Id. at 2187-88 (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1056 (3d ed. 2015)).
86
Id. at 2188.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
82
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Lastly, the Court reasoned that in light of the importance to preserve
states’ powers, where multiple interpretations of a federal statute may be
plausibly found, the courts will ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors
federal preemption of state law.90 This approach is “consistent with both
federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of
health and safety.”91
For the aforementioned reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.92
V. COMMENT
While the immediate impact of the CTS Corp. decision is minimal,
the potential for large-scale implications remains.93 It is undisputed that
allowing potential defendants, who would otherwise be liable for tortuously
creating environmental hazards, to escape liability simply because the
external manifestation of their harm takes longer to process seems unfair.94
Additionally, providing potential defendants a loophole to avoid liability
could incentivize them to plan and execute environmental duties with less
caution knowing that few, if any, claims will be actionable against them.95
Perhaps realizing these harmful implications, following the Supreme
Court’s decree that § 9658 did not preempt state statutes of repose, North
Carolina modified its statute of repose to exempt claims relating to
groundwater contamination, thereby saving future plaintiffs similarly situated
to those in CTS Corp. from being barred by the time limitation.96 This,
coupled with the fact that only four states have enacted generally applicable
statutes of repose,97 indicates that the CTS Corp. decision has little to no
90

Id.
Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
92
Id. at 2189.
93
Justin Pidot & Chelsea Thomas, Supreme Court Rules CERCLA Does Not Preempt State
Statutes of Repose, 46 No. 1 ABA TRENDS 9, 12 (2014).
94
Andrew A. Ferrer, Note, Excuses, Excuses: The Application of Statutes of Repose to
Environmentally-Related Injuries, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 345, 371 (2006).
95
Id. at 372.
96
Pidot & Thomas, supra note 93, at 12.
97
Id. at 10.
91
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substantial legal implications. However, some contend that should more
states choose to adopt statutes of repose, they could easily insulate
commercial and industrial interests from tort liability, where injuries may not
be ascertainable for long periods of time, as was the case for the plaintiffs in
CTS Corp.98
Whether this concern has merit and whether it outweighs important
policy issues of state sovereignty and federalism is up for debate.99 At the
very least, there is an implied presumption against federal preemption of state
law meant to ensure that the delicate balance between federal and state
authority will not be unnecessarily disturbed.100 This is true especially for
matters that are traditionally subject to state regulation, such as the
determination of tort rights and immunities—an area encompassed by
statutes of repose. 101 Thus, where the text of a preemption clause is
ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reading, this presumption will
guide courts to accept the meaning disfavoring preemption.102
Those who believe that § 9658 should be read to include statutes of
repose point out that an important reason for the presumption against
preemption is to ward against federal law preempting state law and to bar
recourse to state liability regimes without placing appropriate federal
remedies in their place.103 In light of these concerns, proponents for a
repose-including interpretation argue that including statutes of repose in §
9658 does not actually detract from state’s legal rights, but instead expands
them so that plaintiffs may continue to bring substantive state law claims.104
In doing so, § 9658 does not preempt or change state tort actions, they argue,
but instead creates national uniformity of commencement dates for tort
actions within its scope.105
98

Id. at 12.
Compare Kyle, supra note 2, at 68 with Craig, supra note 4, at 621 and Adam Bain,
Determining the Preemptive Effect of Federal Law on State Statutes of Repose, 43 U. BALT.
L. REV. 119, 162 (2014).
100
Bain, supra note 99, at 144.
101
Id. at 162.
102
Id. at 146-47.
103
Kyle, supra note 2, at 92.
104
Id. at 93.
105
Id.
99
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At first, courts were hesitant to accept the statutes of limitations
preemption in § 9658 as proper. Now, they seem to have slowly agreed that it
is not a constitutional overreach.106 For example, a handful of cases have
addressed whether § 9658 violates the Tenth Amendment by requiring states
to permit claims that the state law otherwise bars.107 One of the earliest cases
found support for the proposition that § 9658 was constitutional because the
Tenth Amendment does not include an affirmative restriction on the
constitutional authority of Congress to legislate under powers otherwise
conferred by the Commerce Clause.108 And upon objections that the
provision exceeded constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause,
courts have held that § 9658 is an integral part of CERCLA, which itself is
well-connected to interstate commerce.109
Despite being found constitutional, § 9658 has been consistently
interpreted very narrowly.110 Originally, it was interpreted as only applying
to situations in which a state cause of action existed in conjunction with a
CERCLA cause of action.111 This strict standard of applicability was
loosened by a Seventh Circuit case, which ruled that although § 9658 terms
of art cannot be interpreted independently, an accompanying CERCLA claim
was not necessary for § 9658 to apply.112
Additionally, courts have been hesitant to extend the federal
preemption’s reach beyond what is absolutely required by the provision.113
For example, in 1997, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that § 9658 did
not apply to workplace exposures to hazardous substances because the
“release into the environment” requirement of § 9658 did not cover a release
into the workplace. 114 Furthermore, that court noted that the provision’s
ability to retroactively revive state law based claims created serious
106

Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
108
Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 759 F. Supp. 692, 705 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, (1985)).
109
Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 202 (2nd Cir. 2007).
110
Craig, supra note 4, at 637.
111
Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp 752, 758 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
112
Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1988).
113
Craig, supra note 4, at 637.
114
Becton v. Rhone Poulenc, Inc., 706 So. 2d 1134, 1141 (Ala. 1997).
107
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federalism concerns.115 Elsewhere, the Florida Second District Court of
Appeals ruled that the personal injury language of § 9658 does not
encompass wrongful death actions.116 This continued resistance seems to
“create[], at the very least, a perception of federal overreaching into and
commandeering of state law.”117 Yet, despite this resistance, it is now
generally accepted that § 9658 does in fact preempt state statutes of
limitations, and does so constitutionally.118
Somewhat remarkably, only one Supreme Court case explicitly
addressed CERCLA’s possible federalism implications, while no Supreme
Court cases have addressed § 9658 specifically.119 This is particularly
interesting given that the courts have not been shy about addressing such
concerns in connection with other federal environmental statutes that impose
liability on land use.120
One potential reason for this disjunction is that these other
environmental statutes—specifically the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act—directly prohibit certain activities on private
property, whereas CERCLA is simply a liability scheme (although it may
impose substantial liability on these activities if they contaminate the
environment).121 Another reason is that CERCLA provides federal money to
clean up properties, instead of using state tax dollars.122 Yet another
explanation is that CERCLA is not perceived as interfering with land use, but
rather as solving the problem of the increasing, and increasingly costly,
amount of pollution resulting from the growth of the chemical industry in the
United States.123
115

Id. at 1142.
Lee v. CSX Transp., Inc., 958 So. 2d 578, 583-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
117
Craig, supra note 4, at 638; But see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 2 (1989).
118
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014); Rockwell Int’l Corp.
v. Wilhite, 143 S.W.3d 604, 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003); Tower Asphalt, Inc. v. Determan
Welding & Tank Serv., Inc. 530 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Soo Line R.R. Co.
v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472, 1487 (D. Minn. 1992).
119
Craig, supra note 4, at 618.
120
Id. at 641.
121
Id. at 641-42.
122
Id. at 642.
123
Id.
116
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These explanations might explain why CERCLA, as a whole, has
survived the few constitutional challenges lobbied against it. But, it fails to
explain why § 9658, which can drastically change the way state tort and
property law is applied, has been so passively accepted.124 Moreover, some
argue that § 9658’s imposition on state law may raise serious due process and
equal protection challenges.125
Therefore, if § 9658’s preemption of state statutes of limitation has
been so passively accepted as proper under the lens of federalism, why are
statutes of repose so different? One of the main reasons the courts seem to
distinguish between the two limitation periods is because statutes of repose
deal with substantive rights, whereas statutes of limitation are procedural
rights.126 Thus, where a claimant’s failure to take some action within a
statutory limitation period can provide an affirmative defense to a cause of
action, a claimant’s failure to take some action within a statutory repose
period will entirely extinguish a cause of action.127 Because statutes of
repose create a substantive right for putative defendants to be free from
liability after a certain period of time, they are significantly and legally
distinguishable from statutes of limitations and deserve separate and unique
scrutiny.128
This difference, together with the fact that § 9658 does not expressly
mention preempting statutes of repose, could lead to serious breaches of state
sovereignty through the creation of state substantive rights if statutes of
repose are read into this regulation.129 However, a presumption against
preemption can be sufficiently rebutted if there is evidence of congressional
intent that runs contrary to the presumption.130 Evidence of congressional
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intent to include statutes of repose in § 9658 would, at the very least, favor a
presumption that it does not violate federalist concerns.131
To this end, proponents of a repose-including interpretation point out
that the language of § 9658 expressly states that the provision is meant to
preempt state law if “the applicable limitations period for such action (as
specified in the statute of limitations or under common law) provides a
commencement date which is earlier than the federally required
commencement date.”132 Since common law rules of repose exist in certain
states, the result of allowing states that have these common law rules of
repose, as opposed to those that are codified in the statutes, to be
preempted—despite any meaningful distinction between the two—creates an
illogical and inconsistent reading of § 9658.133
However, this argument inflates the commonality of common law
rules of repose. As discussed earlier, while there are only four states with
generally applicable statutes of repose, Alabama appears to be the only state
with a generally applicable rule of repose not codified in a statute and still in
use.134
Moreover, it is likely that any reference to “the common law” in §
9658 was included to incorporate common law principles that could impact
the commencement date of the limitations period, taking into consideration
the fact that some states have judicially interpreted discovery rules.135 This
interpretation is consistent with another area of CERCLA where “the
common law” shows up: the savings clause.136 The savings clause provision
states that “nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person . . . under State law, including
common law.”137 Thus, under a plain reading of the savings clause,
CERCLA intends only to affect state procedural rights, while preserving state
131
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substantive rights.138 And, as previously discussed, since statutes of repose
are considered substantive rights, the logical conclusion suggests that only
statutes of limitations were meant to be preempted under this language.
VI. CONCLUSION
CTS Corp. v. Waldenburg definitively represents that § 9658 of
CERCLA does not include state statutes of repose. This conclusion raises
some interesting questions about the fundamental differences between
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, not just from an operational
standpoint, but also from a federalist perspective. Although the immediate
impact of the instant decision seems to be minimal, how it affects important
principles of federalism and state sovereignty is worth exploring.
While serious concerns with the way CERCLA potentially frees
tortious defendants from liability remain, that argument is outside the scope
of § 9658, which is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. To that end,
even with minimal evidence of legislative intent, attempting to read this
provision to include statutes of repose is merely an exercise in wishful
thinking. If nothing more, the issue is a divisive one, and when no consensus
exists on whose interests to serve, or by what means those interests should be
served, the issue is best left up to the states to decide—especially when that
issue implicates important substantive rights.139 If North Carolina is any
indication, states will rise to the occasion.
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